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1 Introduction "In a word, credibility matters in the theory and it is certainly believed to matter in practice -although empirical evidence on this point is hard to come by because credibility is not easy to measure" (Blinder (2000 (Blinder ( , p.1421 ). This quotation perfectly sums up the complex issues surrounding the concept of central bank credibility. Credibility is an issue of critical importance in modern central banking (González-Páramo (2007) ),
and is viewed as a precious asset not to be squandered (Blinder (1998) ). Nonetheless, despite the growing interest of policymakers and academics in this concept, no clear consensus has emerged on what central bank credibility really means, how it can be established, and especially how it can be measured. The survey conducted by Blinder (2000) indicates that the definition of credibility is not the same for central bankers as it is for academics. In particular, the former more closely relate inflation aversion to credibility than the latter 1 .
According to Blinder (1998 Blinder ( , 2000 , such differences in view between practitioners and academics stems from the fact that the former have a definition of credibility in mind that differs from that formalized within the traditional time-consistency literature originating from Kydland & Prescott (1977) and Barro & Gordon (1983a , 1983b 2 .
Looking back on his experience as a central banker, Blinder (1998) argues that central bankers consider themselves to be credible if their announcements are believed by people, even though they are not bound by a rule that ties their hands. In other words, a monetary authority is said to be credible if "people believe it will do what it says" (Blinder (2000) ), i.e. if deeds are expected to match words. This short and intuitive definition is close to that considered by Cukierman & Meltzer (1986) in their theoretical work. They define credibility as the absolute value of the difference between the central banks planned monetary policy and the private sectors beliefs about these plans. They define in this way the "average credibility of announcements".
On these grounds, in an inflation-targeting framework, credibility means that people believe that the central bank has the willingness, and also the ability to reach the previously announced inflation target. In particular, this means that private sector inflation expectations are anchored on the target and that people do not over-react to target misses. Based on this statement, several scholars have developed measures for assessing the degree of credibility of a central bank. To the best of our knowledge, the first paper that investigated this issue is Svensson (1993) . He compares ex post target-consistent real interest rates with market real interest rates on real bonds to assess whether the inflation-targeting framework is credible or not in Canada, New 1 Nonetheless, practitioners and academics agree with the reasons why credibility is important, and how to build it. Similar results are obtained by Waller & de Haan (2004) using an updated version of the questionnaire initiated by Blinder (2000) .
2 See, notably, Walsh (2010) for an analytical review of this literature.
Zealand and Sweden 3 . However, such an indirect approach considers credibility to be a one/zero variable (credible or not, respectively), while in practice, there exist intermediate degrees of credibility (Blinder (1998) Indeed, they rely on an ad hoc parameter for expected inflation, set to 20%, beyond which the credibility of a central bank is considered to be null. Such a threshold is unjustified, considering the single-digit inflation rates and the decreasing inflation targets in the concerned countries over the last decade. When the target is low, these indicators improperly underestimate the effect of large positive deviations of inflation expectations from the target on credibility, particularly when the target is far from 20%.
Against this background, the first purpose of this paper is to propose a new simple time-varying measure of central bank credibility that addresses the main limitation of the existing indexes. Because we believe that in practice, negative deviations of inflation expectations from the target are less likely to compromise credibility than positive deviations, we provide an asymmetric measure of credibility based on the lin-3 Kupfer (2015) recently used the methodology proposed by Svensson (1993) to assess the monetary policy credibility of the European Central Bank, while Amisano & Tronzano (2010) extended this methodology inside a Bayesian econometric framework. 4 Another category of measures assumes that the current credibility of a central bank is a selfreinforcing process that can be proxied by past inflation performance. In this view, a central bank is expected to gain additional credibility by reaching its publicly announced target repeatedly, i.e., by having "a history of doing what it says it will do" (Blinder (2000) ). Considering this assumption, De Mendonça & de Guimarães e Souza (2009) and Neuenkirch & Tillmann (2014) propose alternative measures of central bank credibility based on the past deviations of inflation from the target. Such backward-looking indicators are particularly relevant for developing countries, for which inflation expectations data are often unavailable.
Introduction ear exponential (LINEX) function. Furthermore, our indicator does not depend on any ad hoc threshold. We compute our index for all emerging countries that adopted an inflation-targeting framework, except for Ghana, for which data on inflation expectations are not available. We then analyze how the credibility of monetary policy has evolved in these economies.
This question of monetary policy credibility is particularly relevant for emerging inflation-targeting countries. A credible central bank is expected to improve the efficiency of monetary policy transmission through two channels: the expectations channel and the interest rate channel. Indeed, if a central bank is credible, people believe that the announced target will be realized. From the observed and expected inflation rate, agents can infer the future path of interest rates. Monetary policy is then easily transmitted along the yield to maturity curve. Moreover, wages and prices are set accordingly. Disinflation is then less costly. Finally, changes in the policy rates are less likely to be considered to be temporary by the banking sector, which is then more prone to pass monetary policy impulses on retail interest rates (Mojon (2001) ). At the extreme, the speeches of the governor become an instrument per se, and are sufficient for governing the stance of monetary policy. It is not necessary to frequently change the level of key interest rates. Consequently, central bank credibility is a self-reinforcing process that emerging economies should seek to strengthen. For this reason, the second purpose of this paper is to evaluate, in the light on our new indicator, the effect of credibility on interest rate volatility. As far as we know, our study is the first that investigates this issue for a large sample of emerging inflation-targeting countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing measures of central bank credibility. Section 3 presents our new index.
Section 4 compares our index with previous indicators and analyzes the evolution of central bank credibility in emerging inflation-targeting countries. Section 5 is devoted to the impact of credibility on interest rate volatility. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Two main types of credibility measures have been developed in the literature. The first refers to the Bomfim & Rudebusch (2000) approach. It consists of assessing the weight the private sector attaches to the inflation target when forming their inflation expectations. More precisely, this approach considers that inflation expectations are determined as a weighted average of the current inflation target and the past inflation rates:
with π e t|T representing the inflation expectations of the private sector formed at time t for the period T,π t representing the inflation target, andπ t−q representing the average of past inflation rates over the q periods considered (π t−q =
). The parameter λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) measures the degree to which expectations are anchored on the target. The higher λ is, the higher the weight attached by the economic agents to the target when forming their expectations, and the higher the central bank credibility. As Bomfim & Rudebusch (2000) argue, with representative agents, λ may be interpreted as the subjective probability that an agent attaches to the future achievement of the target. With heterogeneous agents, λ may represent the fraction of the population believing that the target will be achieved. However, the Bomfim & Rudebusch (2000) approach has received little coverage in the empirical literature, except for the paper of The second type of measures refers to the gap between inflation expectations and the inflation target. It considers any deviations of expectations from the target as a loss of central bank credibility. The index developed by Cecchetti & Krause (2002) belongs to this category. Taking values from 0 (no credibility) to 1 (full credibility), it is defined as follows:
withπ t representing the inflation target pursued by the central bank and π e representing the inflation rate expected by the private sector. The central bank is considered to be fully credible (CRED CK = 1) if expected annual inflation is lower than or equal to the inflation target. On the contrary, it is non-credible (CRED CK = 0) if expected annual inflation is equal to or higher than 20%. Between these two limits, the value of the index decreases linearly as expected inflation increases. This index was first 
with π e representing the inflation rate expected by the private sector andπ Between these two limits, the value of the index decreases linearly. 5 The CREDDM index is not presented here because, as aforementioned, it is certainly too restrictive in that it assumes that credibility is null when inflation expectations are outside the target range. 5 The CREDDM index is not presented here because, as aforementioned, it is certainly too restrictive in that it assumes that credibility is null when inflation expectations are outside the target range. for expected inflation, above which credibility is null.
We consider that an indicator of credibility should fulfill two main properties. First, it should not be based on ad hoc upper and/or lower thresholds but should freely converge towards its extreme values. Second, a credibility indicator should not be linear. Indeed, a critical point for developing a credibility index is the following: should negative and positive deviations of expected inflation from the target be considered equivalent in terms of (loss in) credibility? Surely not. The central bank is mandated to maintain control over the growth rate of prices. Positive deviations clearly signal that people do not believe in the ability of the central bank to meet this commitment. Then, the central bank is not entirely credible. Negative deviations also indicate that people believe that actual inflation will not meet the target. However, private agents consider in this case that the monetary authorities can do even better than the announced target in terms of inflation control. This is rarely perceived as a signal that monetary authorities abandon their objective. On the contrary, people consider that "he who can do more can do less" 6 . As a result, negative deviations are less serious than positive
deviations. An indicator of central bank credibility should take this asymmetry into account, with positive deviations being more serious in terms of credibility loss than negative ones.
We suggest an indicator that satisfies this dual challenge based on the asymmetrical LINEX loss function 7 (partly LINear, partly EXPonential). Notingπ e the deviation between expected inflation (π e ) and the target (π), a LINEX function withπ e as an argument is defined such that:
For φ = 1,π e > 0 will be considered to be more serious thanπ e < 0 (because 6 Typically, the current and expected inflation rates in the euro area have been far below the implicit target of 2%, without impairing the beliefs of agents on the willingness of the European Central Bank (ECB) to control inflation. On the contrary, this achievement reaffirms that European policymakers are perceived to be very attached to their main objective of price stability. Such a situation does not compromise the credibility of the ECB.
7 See Varian (1974) and Zellner (1986) .
the exponential part of the function dominates the linear part when the argument is positive). The figure 2 compares the LINEX function with the usual quadratic one for π = 2%, with the horizontal axis corresponding to π e . We will show below that a credibility indicator can be developed on the basis of such a function, with an inverted-U profile between 0 and 1, as is usual in the literature.
The indicator will be precisely defined in the next subsections, considering two cases based on whether the target is a single value or a range. Further, in each case, we will successively assume first that negative deviations induce a credibility loss and second that they do not imply any credibility loss.
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The target is a single number
We first considerer that the target isπ.
FIRST CASE One considers π e <π to represent a loss in credibility, even if it is less serious than π e >π. Then, we define a new credibility index as the following inverse quasi LINEX function: compromised, but any positive deviation signals a higher loss in credibility than an equivalent negative one. Moreover, the marginal loss in credibility is decreasing with π e . This is an important feature of our indicator. The rationale behind is the following. Assume thatπ = 2%. An expected inflation rate that grows from 14 to 16% should not coincide with a dramatic loss in credibility, as the latter is already hugely damaged (because of the initial π e = 14%). Quite the opposite, a growing expected inflation rate, say from 2 to 5%, must express a higher marginal loss in credibility. An inverted-U credibility curve, with a higher slope in the neighborhood of the target than at its extremities, is then justified.
SECOND CASE Considers that π e <π does not mean a loss in credibility. This is an extreme interpretation of the "he who can do more can do less" hypothesis. Then, our new indicator simply becomes:
The profile of this credibility function is represented at the top right panel of the figure 3.
The target is a range, such thatπ
Again, two cases are to be considered, depending now on whether π e t <π min is synonymous with a loss in credibility or not.
FIRST CASE π e t <π min signals loss in credibility. Then,
The bottom left panel of the figure 3 illustrates this case for a range corresponding to
SECOND CASE π e <π min does not imply loss in credibility. Then,
The corresponding profile is represented in the bottom right panel of the figure 3.
CRED LLR1 and CRED LLR2 are computed for all emerging economies that adopted an inflation-targeting framework, except for Ghana whose survey data on inflation expectations are not available. This monetary policy strategy is currently led by 18 emerging countries, while Slovakia abandoned inflation targeting in January 2009
to join the euro area. Our sample is then composed of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey.
Data and periods
For each country, the CRED LLR1 and CRED LLR2 indexes are computed on a monthly basis and cover the period between the effective inflation targeting adoption date (if data on inflation expectations are available) and December 2013. Table 1 provides some details concerning inflation targeting adoption dates and data availability.
Concerning private sector inflation expectations, we use the forecast survey dataset provided by Consensus Economics, which gathers forecasts of professional analysts for a large range of macroeconomic variables. The surveyed forecasters are located in their respective country and are working in the financial sector. Therefore, they have a good idea of how inflation will evolve in the medium-term. Moreover, they are more forward-looking than other categories of the population, such as consumers 8 . Because the forecasts are provided for the current and the next calendar year on a monthly basis, we construct a monthly sample of twelve-month ahead expected inflation by taking the weighted arithmetic average of the mean forecast for the current year and the next year, defined as follows:
with t representing the month (with 1 (= January) ≤ t ≤12 (=December)) at the time of the forecast. Thus, by December, the forecast for the current year is already irrelevant and the forecast for the next year receives full weight (t=12). Most of the studies using data from the Consensus Economics adopt this approach for constructing twelve-month ahead forecasts (see, e.g., Beck (2001) to December or January, the interpolated data will overlap two different years. This is a problem when data aims to measure the expected evolution of the consumer price index over a given year. So, we distinguish two cases. On the one hand, if the missing data refer to December, we consider for this month the observation of November of the same year. Similarly, if the missing data refer to January, we consider for this month the observation of February of the same year. On the other hand, if the missing data do not refer to December or January, i.e., if the months before and after the missing observations belong to the same year, a linear interpolation is used.
At this stage, it is important to underline that credibility is often viewed as a medium or long-run concept. However, the countries we consider have rather short run horizon for their objective, as it can be seen in the column "Target Horizon" of Thus, an indicator based on long-run expectations -even though they were availablewould be inadequate for assessing the credibility of the central banks considered in this paper. Our results are consistent with previous empirical studies showing that the adoption of an inflation-targeting framework in emerging economies has helped to better anchor private-sector inflation expectations (see, e.g., IMF (2008), Davis (2014) ) and to reduce their dispersion (Capistrán & Ramos-Francia (2010) ).
Second, focusing on the one year and the two years following the adoption of inflation targeting (columns 1 and 2 of table 2), it appears that the introduction of this new monetary framework was initially perceived as not very credible (Romania, Turkey), if not non-credible (the Czech Republic, Indonesia) by the private sector. Such an initial lack of credibility could be explained by the fact that these countries did not fully satisfy the macroeconomic and institutional preconditions for adopting inflation targeting, such as central bank independence and transparency, fiscal discipline, or exchange rate flexibility. More importantly, the Turkish experience shows that the initial lack of central bank credibility has led to a loss in inflation control and a self-9 As CREDLLR1 and CREDLLR2 are very close to each other, we only present the characteristics of the former and we will only focus on CREDLLR1 in the following sections.
10 According to Habermeier,Ötker-Robe, Jacome, Giustiniani, Ishi, Vavra, Kişinbay & Vazquez (2009), this inflationary episode was the first significant test for the credibility of the inflation targeting regimes in emerging countries. Similarly, the existing indicators do not appropriately address the (sometimes huge) deviations of inflation expectations from the target that typically occurred in South Africa, Indonesia, the Philippines and Hungary, contrary to CRED LLR1 and CRED LLR2 .
policy instrument
Baseline estimates
We now investigate the extent to which central bank credibility, as measured by our new indicator, influences the volatility of the key instrument of monetary policy, namely the short-term interest rate. This is an important issue, as a credible central bank is more likely to anchor inflation expectations to its target. In such a case, the central banker does not have to move his key instrument too much to influence the yield curve in the desired direction. At the extreme, speeches are enough. On the contrary, noncredibility is penalizing in that it implies more volatility of the interest rate, while the variance of the interest rate theoretically enters the micro-founded welfare-based loss function of central banks 11 . Furthermore, the volatility of the monetary policy instrument increases macroeconomic uncertainty and (financial) instability. Thus, we want to test the following hypothesis: a higher (lower) credibility contributes to a lower (higher) volatility of the interest rate.
A similar issue has been addressed by De Mendonça & de Guimarães e Souza (2009) in the case of Brazil. However, they do not explicitly assess the relationship between credibility and interest rate volatility, as they regress the first-difference of the interest rate on the variation of their credibility index by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates. We consider a General Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) approach to be more adequate for analyzing the volatility of any variable.
We will use such a model to test whether our index of credibility significantly influences the conditional variance of interest rates.
As usual, the mean equation of our GARCH model aims to deliver white noise residuals, whose conditional variance is investigated in a second step. For this purpose, we assume that the interest rate follows an AR(p) process. p = 2 is found to be enough for obtaining white noise residuals (except for Columbia and Poland, for which p = 3, see infra), in the baseline model, such as:
ε t represents the innovations of the short-term interest rate (free of inflationary shocks) at time t with a zero mean and time-varying variance h t . More precisely, we suppose that ε t = z t √ h t , with z t representing a standardized white noise residual. The time-varying conditional variance of the interest rate is supposed to follow an Exponential General Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (EGARCH) process, augmented with the lagged CRED LLR1 indicator as an additional determinant.
Its general representation is given by:
with g (z t−i ) = θz t−i + γ (|z t−i | − E|z t−i |), where E|z t−i | is conditional to a given density function. While estimating a GARCH(p,q) model requires the parameters α i and β i to be positive (because variance cannot be negative), the EGARCH(p,q) model is expressed in terms of the log of h t . Thus the conditional variance will always be positive whatever the sign of the parameters (Nelson (1991) ). This is important in our specific case because CRED LLR1 is expected to have a negative influence on the conditional variance of the interest rate (namely, ω is expected to be negative).
The first column of table 7 in appendix reports the results of excess kurtosis tests for the interest rate data series. The null hypothesis of normality is only rejected for Colombia, the Czech Republic and Mexico. For these three countries, a Student's t distribution with a degree of freedom v (to be estimated) is then preferred to a normal one, as is usual in the case of leptokurtic distribution. Table 7 in appendix also reports the results of no ARCH effect tests. Such a test requires serially uncorrelated ε t . However, the usual Q tests of no serial correlation rely on an assumption of conditional homoscedasticity. So we used the "robust" Q test suggested by West & Cho (1995) . As indicated in the fourth column, the null hypothesis of an absence of serial correlation is not rejected at the usual risk levels for every country, even if we have some doubt about Peru. Finally, the hypothesis of no ARCH effect (for lags = 2, 4 and 6 months) is clearly rejected for most of the countries, except for Hungary, Israel, Slovakia, Thailand and Turkey. For the other countries, the interest rate data series exhibit types of large residual clustering that is consistent with a GARCH specification. Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation of the baseline EGARCH(1,1)-X models 12 . Focusing on the variance equation, the nullity of α 1 and β 1 is rejected for every country, except for the nullity of α 1 for the Czech Republic and South Korea.
So, the current conditional variance of the interest rate is significantly explained by past innovations contained both in g(.) and in the past conditional variance h t−1 .
This confirms the existence of ARCH effects and supports our econometric approach.
Moreover, according to the test suggested by McLeod & Li (1983) , the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for the squared standardized residuals is never rejected at the usual risk levels. This suggests that the variance equation is correctly specified with the orders q = 1 and p = 1 chosen for the EGARCH. In the same way, a second-order autoregressive process is found to be appropriate for the mean equation (third-order Notes: Std. errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Notes: Std. errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. at the usual risk levels. Finally, the fact that the estimated degrees of freedom are low (close to but higher than 2) for Colombia, the Czech Republic and Mexico validates ex post the choice of a Student's t distribution. Despite the very important informational content of the past conditional variance h t−1 , we find that the coefficient associated with CRED LLR1 is always statistically significant, except for Indonesia and Mexico, and negative. This confirms that central bank credibility decreases the volatility of the key instrument of monetary policy. In that sense, credibility improves the efficiency of monetary policy, notably through the expectations channel.
However, one can argue that central bank credibility evolves according to a gradual process, as it can rarely be suddenly increased or annihilated (see, e.g., Blinder (2000)).
In this respect, we have replaced the one-lagged value of CRED LLR1 by its 6-month and 12-month moving average in the variance equation of the EGARCH models. The corresponding results are reported in tables 8 and 9 in the appendix. The significance of credibility is found to be very robust to this alternative specification. The results are qualitatively the same as for the baseline estimates (just the MA(6) measure of credibility is insignificant for Peru).
Robustness checks
Certainly, it can be considered that on average the gap between the expected inflation and the inflation target is all the more weak that actual inflation is itself close to the target. However, we argue that it is precisely because the Central Bank is credible that actual inflation is close to the target, with the exception of exogenous inflationary shocks. These shocks, which have to be excluded from the variance equation, are now explicitly considered in the mean equation through the inclusion of the inflation rate, such as:
Thus, the residuals of this equation clearly represent the intentional efforts of the central banker to reach its final objective, beyond the exogenous shocks.
The corresponding results are in table 5 and table 6 below. We can observe that the results hold to the inclusion of the inflation rate (which is significant in most cases)
in the MEAN equation. The significance of the credibility index CRED LLR1 is the same as for the baseline estimates.
Finally, as the MEAN equation (13) Notes: Std. errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The expected inflation is less often found significant compared to the current inflation, though always with a positive sign. More importantly, the significance of the credibility index CRED LLR1 is the same as in the baseline estimates. Thus, as summarized in The aim of this article was to provide a simple time-varying metric of central bank credibility. To this end, we suggest a measure of credibility based on the gap between private sector inflation expectations and the inflation target. In contrast to the existing measures, our index introduces two major innovations. First, it is an asymmetric measure of credibility that is based on a linear-exponential (LINEX) function. Indeed, one can expect that, in practice, negative deviations of inflation expectations from the target are less likely to indicate a loss in credibility than positive deviations. Second, contrary to the main contributions to date, our measure does not impose any ad hoc threshold above which credibility is considered to be null.
We then compute our index for all emerging inflation-targeting countries and compare it to the existing indicators. Our findings suggest a relatively high level of central bank credibility in these countries over the inflation targeting period. Nonetheless, we observe that monetary policy was not necessarily perceived to be very credible in the immediate wake of inflation targeting adoption, in particular in the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Romania, and Turkey. More importantly, we show that our measure is more suited to assess the monetary experiences of these economies than the existing ones. In particular, our index is better able to discriminate between the periods of low versus high credibility in a context of rather low inflation targets.
Finally, we empirically investigate the linkage between central bank credibility (measured by our index) and short-term interest rate volatility. An EGARCH model is used to this end. Our results confirm that the level of credibility negatively impacts the variance of the interest rate in a large number of countries. This conclusion is highly robust. Therefore it confirms first that our indicator actually measures credibility; otherwise, there would be no alternative reason why a gap between expected inflation and the inflation target would have an impact on the volatility of the main monetary policy instrument. Next, the results suggest that a credible central bank does not need to frequently change its key instrument to reach the inflation target.
Credibility is then expected to improve the efficiency of monetary policy transmission, particularly through the expectations channel. In terms of policy implications, it implies that candidates for an inflation-targeting framework need to previously make institutional reforms that will ensure an initial high level of credibility. Otherwise, an initial weak credibility could lead to higher and self-sustaining volatility in interest rates (as indicated by our GARCH experiments), which in turn would trigger higher macroeconomic instability. 
